Corrections to My Paper: John Locke on Personal Identity

Dear Editors,

This is with reference to my paper, ‘John Locke on Personal Identity’, published in Mens Sana Monographs (2011) Vol. 9, No 1, Jan–Dec 2011 (pp. 268-75[2]). I thank the editors for bringing it to my notice that the citations in the paper were inadequate. Kindly find the necessary citations which were earlier not mentioned in the paper.

1. “Personal identity theory is the philosophical confrontation with the ultimate …………………………………………………………… the identity of the person over time.” (Korfmacher, 2006[1]) [p. 268 of my paper]

2. “Locke holds that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity.” (Korfmacher, 2006[1]) [p. 269 of my paper]

3. “Locke’s answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative. Consciousness …………………………………………… affirmations amount to the claim that the same soul or thinking substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity over time.” (Uzgalis, 2007[3]) [p. 269 of my paper]

4. “One answer is that the distinction solves the problem of the resurrection of the dead. What is this problem? The problem begins with Biblical texts asserting that we will have the same body at the resurrection as we did in this life.” (Uzgalis, 2007[3]) [p. 270 of my paper]

5. “His account of personal identity is embedded in a general account of identity”. (Uzgalis, 2007[3]) [p. 273 of my paper].

Please accept my sincere regret and apologies for the inconvenience caused to the editors of Mens Sana Monograph and readers. I once again thank the editors for being patient and understanding towards me, in the entire ordeal.